AI inherits access through integrations
When a model is connected to file stores, ticketing systems, CRMs, or identity workflows, it operates with the permissions of the integration; not the user’s intent.
Organizations are rapidly connecting models to internal data and action-taking systems: ticketing, knowledge bases, document stores, identity workflows, and approvals. The result is a new “insider” with broad access and no human judgment.
AI risk is not only model risk. It is workflow risk.
The primary risk is not that a model “becomes malicious.” The risk is that organizations build high-trust workflows where AI can access sensitive data, make recommendations that are treated as authority, and trigger actions through integrations; without the controls normally required for privileged human operators.
When a model is connected to file stores, ticketing systems, CRMs, or identity workflows, it operates with the permissions of the integration; not the user’s intent.
Summaries, suggested actions, auto-filled approvals, and workflow automation can translate imperfect outputs into irreversible changes.
AI is deployed faster than governance can adapt; creating privileged pathways without ownership, logging, or clear decision authority.
Privilege is rarely granted “to the model.” It emerges through convenience.
“Search everything” features often pull from sources with different classifications, retention rules, and access intent; then present outputs as a single unified answer.
When an AI suggests approvals for access requests, vendor onboarding, or exceptions, it compresses the deliberation that normally prevents risky decisions.
If a model can trigger workflows; create users, modify permissions, reset credentials, open firewall rules, deploy scripts; the model becomes an operational operator.
Prompts, outputs, and tool logs can contain credentials, incident details, customer data, and proprietary information; often retained longer than anyone expects.
The best approach is not “AI policy.” It is identity, logging, and control-plane discipline applied to AI-enabled workflows.
AI tools should use scoped service identities with minimal access; not broad “read all” connectors that implicitly expand blast radius.
Any workflow that changes access, deletes data, or triggers external communication should require explicit human approval with audit logging.
Capture prompts, tool calls, retrieved sources, actions taken, and who initiated the workflow. Without this, incidents will be uninvestigable.
Maintain an inventory of AI-enabled workflows, their connected systems, and what data/action scope they can reach; then treat changes as governance events.