Backup success is a technical metric
Backup jobs report completion, not restorability under degraded identity, missing credentials, or compromised infrastructure.
Backup dashboards often look green right up until an incident. When ransomware strikes, organizations discover that having backups is not the same as restoring the business.
Recovery fails under pressure, not because backups are missing, but because assumptions were never tested.
In ransomware incidents, recovery fails not because data is unrecoverable, but because access, authority, and sequencing were never designed for crisis conditions.
Backup jobs report completion, not restorability under degraded identity, missing credentials, or compromised infrastructure.
Restoring the business requires people, permissions, systems, dependencies, and time; all under stress and scrutiny.
Attackers assume restoration will be slower and harder than leaders expect; and they plan accordingly.
These failures appear repeatedly across industries and tooling stacks.
Backup operators lose access when identity is reset or compromised. Break-glass paths are missing, untested, or insecure.
Systems restore cleanly but cannot function because authentication, DNS, certificates, SaaS integrations, or upstream services are unavailable.
Leaders expect hours; reality is days. Large restores saturate storage, networks, and staff.
Recovery teams are interrupted by executives, customers, insurers, and investigators; slowing progress at exactly the wrong moment.
When recovery timelines collapse, decision pressure escalates rapidly.
The longer restoration takes, the more attractive payment appears; even when leadership previously rejected that option.
Extended downtime increases scrutiny and raises questions about whether data theft occurred.
Stakeholders lose trust when recovery plans diverge from reality.
Recovery readiness is measured in outcomes, not dashboards.
Test restores assuming identity disruption, limited staff, and degraded tooling.
Backup infrastructure, credentials, and consoles require the same protection as domain admins.
Define acceptable downtime per system and rehearse decisions before crisis.
Ensure executives understand realistic recovery timelines before ransomware tests them.