Misconception
“If it isn’t in the EDR console, it didn’t happen”
In modern environments, critical actions occur in identity providers, SaaS control planes, management tools, and backup platforms — not on endpoints.
Research Note · Ransomware Operations
EDR Blindspots
Where ransomware still wins
Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) is table stakes — and ransomware crews know it. Modern campaigns succeed not because EDR is “bad,” but because organizations assume endpoint telemetry equals organizational visibility. It doesn’t.
Coverage gaps
Identity-led attacks
Recovery sabotage
The breach rarely fails on the endpoint. It fails in the spaces EDR doesn’t own.
Executive summary
EDR reduces risk — but it cannot be your only “truth”
EDR is optimized for endpoint events: process creation, command lines, persistence, and malicious binaries. Ransomware operations are optimized for control-plane compromise: identity, remote management, orchestration, and recovery denial. The gap between those optimizations is where ransomware still succeeds.
Reality
Attackers prefer legitimate tools
Crews increasingly operate with built-in administration tools, remote management, and cloud APIs that do not look like malware — and often don’t trigger EDR.
Outcome
Organizations get “surprised” at detonation
The time to detect a ransomware operation is during control-plane preparation. Many teams only notice it when encryption begins — after leverage is established.
Blindspot
1) Coverage gaps: endpoints you don’t actually control
EDR works on endpoints where the agent is installed, healthy, and reporting. Ransomware crews plan around places it isn’t.
Unmanaged devices and shadow IT
Contractors, BYOD, legacy systems, lab machines, and “temporary” servers often fall outside standard EDR coverage — and become footholds.
Servers that can’t run modern agents
Older operating systems, embedded devices, and niche workloads create “silent zones” where telemetry is limited and patching is delayed.
Agent health as a false assumption
An installed agent is not the same as a functioning agent. Reporting gaps, misconfigurations, exclusions, and licensing scope reduce effective coverage.
Blindspot
2) Identity-led operations: ransomware without “malware”
Modern ransomware campaigns are increasingly identity-first. If an attacker controls identity, they control access, persistence, and execution paths — without noisy binaries.
Privileged access and role abuse
Compromised admin roles enable policy manipulation, new accounts, service principals, and delegated access — shaping the battlefield before detonation.
Token theft and session reuse
Tokens and sessions bypass MFA and reduce alert volume. EDR may never see the initial identity compromise if it occurs through browser/session theft or cloud-native abuse paths.
Cloud control planes as execution platforms
Ransomware crews increasingly use SaaS and cloud-native administration to enumerate, exfiltrate, and pressure organizations before encrypting anything.
Blindspot
3) Remote management tooling: the attacker’s force multiplier
The fastest way to deploy ransomware across an environment is to use the tools you already use to manage it.
RMM and endpoint management
Remote management platforms allow scripting, software deployment, and command execution at scale. If compromised, they become a turnkey ransomware distribution channel.
Built-in admin channels
Windows administration, remote shells, and orchestration systems can be used to stage actions in ways that look operational rather than malicious.
“Living off the land” reduces EDR confidence
When attackers operate through legitimate admin processes, EDR detections become harder to tune: too strict breaks IT, too loose enables adversaries.
Blindspot
4) Recovery sabotage: the part most teams don’t see coming
Encryption is not the primary weapon. Denying recovery is. Crews increasingly spend time weakening restoration and response before they ever detonate.
Backups are targeted early
Backup consoles, repositories, immutable settings, and admin accounts become objectives. If attackers can delete, encrypt, or disable backups, payment pressure increases.
Identity recovery paths are attacked
Break-glass accounts, admin access, and key security policies are manipulated to delay containment and keep defenders in the dark.
Monitoring and logging are degraded
If telemetry retention is weak or alerting is brittle, attackers can create long dwell time without detection — and strike when it hurts most.
Leadership impact
Why “we have EDR” is not a ransomware strategy
Executives often treat EDR as proof of readiness. The reality is that EDR is one sensor. Ransomware readiness is a system.
EDR does not measure survivability
Survivability is the ability to restore operations under pressure. EDR reduces some intrusion risk, but it does not guarantee recovery.
Signal overload creates false reassurance
Large alert volumes can create the perception of coverage while masking the absence of visibility in identity and control planes.
Attackers exploit decision friction
When response authority is unclear, ransomware crews gain time to finish staging, sabotage recovery, and amplify extortion leverage.
Program direction
Closing the blindspots without boiling the ocean
The goal is not “perfect telemetry.” The goal is detecting control-plane preparation and protecting recovery — the two areas where ransomware operations are most likely to succeed.
Priority
Make coverage real
Inventory endpoints and ensure agent health, exclusions, and logging are consistent. Unknown assets are attacker assets.
Priority
Instrument identity and admin planes
Monitor privileged role use, app consent, token anomalies, and policy changes. Detect “successful misuse,” not just failed logins.
Priority
Protect remote tooling like critical infrastructure
Treat RMM, management platforms, and admin automation as high-value targets: strong identity controls, segmentation, and rapid detection for abnormal use.
Priority
Harden recovery against sabotage
Ensure backups are isolated, tested, and resilient to admin compromise. Recovery is the real bargaining power.