Key idea
Global Admin is the ultimate “control plane” role
It can modify the tenant’s guardrails, not just operate inside them. That is a different class of risk than “admin access” in a single workload.
Research Note · Identity Governance
Why “Global Admin” Is Still
the most dangerous job title in IT
In Microsoft 365 and Entra ID, “Global Admin” is not a convenience role. It is a tenant-level superpower. When that role is broadly assigned, routinely used, or poorly governed, it becomes the single fastest path from “one compromised account” to “total organizational compromise.”
Tenant-wide blast radius
Quiet persistence options
Governance failure mode
Global Admin is not a permission. It’s a business continuity risk.
Executive summary
The risk is not just compromise. It’s control.
When Global Admin is compromised, the attacker can do more than access data. They can change policies, create persistence, reduce visibility, and delay detection—all using “legitimate” administrative actions. This is why Global Admin compromises can remain quiet for weeks: the adversary can actively shape what you can see and how you respond.
Misconception
“We need it for day-to-day”
Most day-to-day tasks can be delegated to narrower roles. Global Admin becomes common because it’s easy—not because it’s necessary.
Outcome
Small errors become catastrophic incidents
Overuse of Global Admin turns routine mistakes—phishing, device compromise, credential leakage—into tenant-level takeover events.
Why it’s dangerous
Three reasons Global Admin remains a top-tier attack objective
Attackers don’t need “full domain admin” if the tenant itself is the domain. Global Admin collapses the distance between initial access and strategic control.
1) It enables durable, low-noise persistence
Once Global Admin is in play, persistence can be created through legitimate constructs: roles, app registrations, consents, conditional access exclusions, and delegated administration.
2) It can reduce visibility while looking “normal”
Administrative actions are expected. If logging and alerting aren’t protected, Global Admin can weaken detection and shift attention away from the real activity.
3) It can sabotage recovery paths
Identity recovery, break-glass configuration, MFA enforcement, and key integrations can be modified to delay containment or lock defenders out at the worst possible time.
Failure modes
How organizations accidentally manufacture Global Admin risk
The most common issue isn’t “one too many Global Admins.” It’s an entire operating model built around tenant superusers.
Too many persistent Global Admin assignments
People keep Global Admin “just in case,” then use it for normal tasks. Over time, the role becomes the default.
Global Admin from unmanaged endpoints
If privileged sessions occur on personal devices, shared admin workstations, or endpoints without strong controls, your tenant’s fate is tied to the weakest laptop.
No separation between “operate” and “govern”
The same people who administer workloads can also change security controls and logging. That collapses oversight.
Break-glass accounts treated as “rarely used” instead of “high-risk”
Emergency access is necessary, but it must be engineered and monitored like a nuclear option—not like a spare key.
Program direction
A safer admin model that still works in reality
The goal is not “zero Global Admins.” The goal is to make Global Admin rare, controlled, auditable, and hard to use incorrectly.
Move
Minimize standing Global Admin
Use narrow roles for routine tasks. Keep Global Admin assignments minimal and intentionally justified. Treat every additional Global Admin as an increase in existential risk.
Move
Use privileged elevation for privileged work
Global Admin should be time-bound and purpose-bound. Make privileged work an explicit action, not a default identity.
Move
Require hardened admin paths
Privileged sessions should originate from hardened devices and networks. Assume the user workstation is the primary attack surface.
Move
Protect your visibility and recovery controls
Logging, alerting, key policies, and emergency access must be monitored and guarded. If an attacker can change what you can see, you are negotiating with a blindfold.
Governance signals
Questions leaders should ask
These questions translate a technical admin model into executive risk language: blast radius, oversight, and survivability.
Question
How many people can change our security posture in 5 minutes?
If the answer is “more than a handful,” you have a governance problem—regardless of MFA adoption.
Question
Can we detect and reverse privileged changes quickly?
Measure time to notice and time to revert for: policy changes, new privileged roles, OAuth grants, and logging adjustments.
Question
Do we have a rehearsed “tenant recovery” play?
Recovery should assume a privileged compromise: how you regain control, what you trust, and how you keep the business moving.